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Will farmers work together for conservation? The potential limits of farmers’ 
cooperation in agri-environment measures 
Abstract 
There is growing concern that Agri-environment Schemes (AESs) may not be effective in 
conserving the countryside. Particular concern has arisen around whether the current 
approach of individual, farm-level, AES agreements are sufficient to offer landscape-scale 
environmental protection and enhancement. Whilst recent additions to AESs have sought to 
encourage more joined-up thinking by offering payments to farmers to form collective 
agreements, uptake is low and there is very little known about farmers’ (non)resistance to 
such collective conservation. Drawing on in-depth qualitative research with 74 farms across 5 
sites in the UK, this paper provides new data on the barriers to farmers’ uptake of collective 
AESs and offers a new formulation of how we understand farming cooperation. The paper 
advances Bourdieusian-inspired ideas of the cultural construct of ‘good farming’ by 
synthesising these with recent reconceptualizations of ‘trust’ in order to provide a more 
contextually grounded and temporally-inflected understanding of farmers’ cooperative 
activities. The findings reveal that whilst working relations between farmers are often 
collegiate, and in places collective, several watershed events over past decades have led to a 
shift from community-level to process-based (peer-to-peer) trust and a move toward land 
management being depicted as a squarely individual rather than collective issue. 
Conceptually, the paper moves beyond the current limitation of viewing trust, and the 
associated development of social capital – seen as a prerequisite for more collective AESs – 
as cumulative and one-directional to highlighting their multiple, issue-specific, nature which 
may become eroded and (re)developed over time. Alongside this, the paper offers a new way 
of understanding the good farmer by shifting the focus from the individual farm/farmer level 
to a more fine-grained and contextualised issue-centered notion of good farming. This is then 
used to explain the seeming reluctance of land holders, evidenced in official statistics, to 
engage in collective AESs.  
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Will farmers work together for conservation? The potential limits of farmers’ 
cooperation in agri-environment measures 
1. Introduction 
Farmland conservation has become an increasingly central focus of European agricultural 
policy in recent years. Indeed Batary et al (2015, p.1008) have suggested that it has become 
an ‘obsession’ – pointing to both monetary outlay on agri-environment schemes (AESs) as 
well as the total areas under scheme management.1 Now, over three decades since their first 
introduction, there is an emerging critical reflection on the success of AESs, with some 
criticisms levelled at both their economic benefits (Quillérou et al., 2011) and, more 
fundamentally, the ecological and biodiverity benefits they offer (Kleijn et al., 2006).2 In 
particular, questions have been raised over their broader-scale benefits and whether AESs can 
adequately facilitate ‘coherent and resilient’ networks, which will support species mobility, 
reproduction, genetic diversity, feeding and breeding ranges (Lawton et al.,2010, p.v), as well 
as offer the landscape connectivity and permeability which may allow mitigation against 
climate change (Hopkins,2009). A key structural issue for AESs  in this regard, particularly 
as they have been implemented in the UK, is that although they might have a landscape-scale 
ambition, they have largely been implemented in the form of individual, farm-scale, 
agreements (Emery and Franks,2012; Prager et al.,2012; van Dijk et al.,2015). This format of 
voluntary delivery - common in most EU countries - may only facilitate partial coverage. 
That is, individual farms participating in AESs may be surrounded by non-participating ones, 
which might serve to negate some of the potential biodiversity benefits of participation, such 
as through effectively creating ‘ecological trap’ (Kentie et al. 2013) for example. Related to 
this, even where adjacent farms may be participating in AESs, the individual, discreet, nature 
of their agreements may mean that managements may be replicated and desired mosaic 
effects of habitats not realised (Schekkerman et al.,2008).  
In addressing such cross-scalar challenges, DEFRA’s (2011, p.25) biodiversity strategy 
points to a vision of “encouraging more collaborative working to achieve landscape-scale 
action”.3 As Lawton et al (2010) suggest, such ambitions require a fundamental ‘step-change’ 
                                                 
1 As an example, they suggest 3.23 billion euros was spent on AESs by the European Commission in 2012.  
2
 Although there are earlier examples of schemes aimed at farmland conservation, most European AESs are 
traceable to the Agricultural Structures Regulation of 1985 (European Union [EU] Regulation 797/85). 
3 This is born out of Regulation (EU) No. 1305/2013 2013 on support for rural development by the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), which states that compensation is available for the 
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in the way that farmland conservation schemes operate. Franks and Emery (2013) reflect on 
several ways that, hypothetically, more collaborative forms of conservation may be 
developed through AES agreements (Figure 1).4 These range from the current situation of 
relying on as many individual agreements as possible to add up to a level of landscape 
protection, through to more proactive – and likely more complex and expensive – options 
whereby farmers coordinate joint agreements. Villanueva et al (2015. p.143) have recently 
noted in the pages of this journal, that this idea of farmers collectively signing AES contracts 
has received “scarce attention in the literature” and Stock et al (2014, p.412) concur that there 
is need to pay “greater attention to the micro/macro relationships between actors at and across 
different scales” including the farm-level. At first glance, the idea of collaborative 
agreements would seem a logical extension of the current position, particularly if additional 
financial inducements were offered to cover the transactional costs of such joint agreements. 
However, the now voluminous literature on individual farmer participation offers several 
insights to suggest that this issue is likely to be more complicated. First, economic aspects of 
AES participation are only part of the consideration, with several studies noting that social 
status and standing may make AESs more or less culturally acceptable and that “structuring 
subsidy schemes to encourage farmers to co-operate is insufficient to address this issue” 
(Sutherland and Burton,2011, p.252). Second, and related, there may be distinct geographical 
variations both in farmers’ willingness to participate as well as their ability, in terms of 
having features on their farm worthy of conservation, to do so. Thirdly, farmers’ conservation 
practices and environmental ideologies are temporally layered, meaning that how individuals 
engage with schemes is rarely just a present-centered decision – instead taking in both past 
farming history and future aspirations (Riley, 2011a;2016; Wynne-Jones,2017). Indeed, 
whilst there are examples of functioning environmental cooperatives in areas such as the 
Netherlands (Renting and Van Der Ploeg,2001), Westerink et al (2014, p.1504) illustrate that 
such cases may not be easily replicated in other areas in suggesting that: “In the Dutch 
situation, it has taken decades to develop the culture of cooperation in agri-environmental 
management”. 
                                                 
transaction costs associated with ‘joint approaches to environmental projects and ongoing environmental 
practices’ (Supplementary sheet 1.11).  
4 In addition to the environmental benefits, others have pointed to the potential economic benefits of 
collaborative agreements through reduced transactions costs for both governments and individual landowners as 
well as potentially reducing costs of monitory and enforcement (Franks 2011). 
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The following paper examines whether farmers will collaborate within AESs. It does this 
through offering a more detailed and nuanced understanding of farmers’ cooperative and 
collective activities than has existed to date. Specifically, it places current (non)collective 
activities in wider historical context and in doing so bring much-needed attention to their 
multiple and multi-faceted nature and the resultant implications for the current desire to foster 
more collective AESs. 5  Following a review of the broader literature on AESs and cross-farm 
cooperation, the paper presents the conceptual framing and methodological approach taken in 
the studies from which the paper is drawn, before presenting its main findings and 
recommendations.  
2. Background  
2.1 Farming cooperation and agri-environmental management 
There is a large and relatively diverse literature on cooperation within agriculture – both in 
relation to the empirical foci and geographical contexts, as well as the conceptual approaches 
taken. Having much of its origins within agricultural economics (see for example 
Rhodes,1983), early research in this area focussed specifically on the economic/competitive 
advantages of farms using cooperative purchasing and marketing. Whilst such research 
tended to focus on formalised cooperative relations, Emery et al (2017) note a more recent 
broadening to informal forms of cooperative relations and their ‘more than economic’ 
elements, with two clear trajectories: that focussing on cooperation as a movement, such as 
those around food security and fair trade (see Bacon,2015) and more micro-scale 
considerations of how cooperative and collective farming sits alongside (and potentially 
clashes with) autonomy in (re)framing farmers’ individual identities (Stock and 
Forney,2014). The latter strand of this research has paid attention to the importance of social 
capital within cooperative relations – a theme returned to in the discussion of the paper’s 
conceptual framing in the next section. 
Although cooperative working has featured for some time in rural development policy, 
particularly relating to community development and cohesion (e.g. Fazzi,2011), it has only 
recently been formalised in agri-environmental policy under the European Agricultural Fund 
for Rural Development (EAFRD). Reviews of extant schemes and cross-farm use of AESs 
have been provided elsewhere (see Franks and Emery,2013; Prager,2015b; van Dijk et 
                                                 
5 The paper does not focus on the contractual and legal issues of such collaborative agreements. For a 
consideration of these issues see Franks (2011).  
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al.,2015), and key lessons can be drawn on their nature, challenges, and potential 
applicability to other geographical contexts. The Netherlands – a country much vaunted for 
its history of cooperative agricultural relations – is one of the few areas to have longer-term 
experiences of agri-environmental collaboration, with Environmental Cooperatives (EC) 
existing since the 1990s. Whilst the reported advantages of ECs include a strengthening of 
farmers’ voices in the design and implementation of schemes (van Dijk et al.,2015) and 
potentially lower transaction costs (Franks and Mc Gloin,2007), challenges have included a 
lack of observable ‘outcomes’ or ‘results’ which serve to reduce the initial enthusiasm of 
some participants; a lack of professional knowledge – at least at the time of inception – 
particularly relating to specific environmental management; and legal arrangements being 
particularly challenging to coordinate (Glasbergen,2000). Prager and Vanclay (2010) 
consider the ‘Landcare’ groups in Germany (through comparison with their Australian 
namesake) - which develop collaborations drawing on AES funding - and note the positive 
outcome of fostering clearer communication between farmers and environment experts, 
something echoed in Reed et al’s (2014) reflection on the Common Grazing option in the 
Welsh Glastir Scheme, which saw farmers working collectively in undertaking grazing and 
capital works on common land.  
The broader UK context – both actual and hypothetical – is considered in Franks et al (2016) 
and Franks and Emery’s (2013) account of the then Environmental Stewardship Scheme 
(ESS) Higher Level Option HR8 (2005-2015) and the more recent facilitation funds offered 
in the Countryside Stewardship Scheme (CSS). Structural challenges noted of the former, 
were that these were discretionary agreements and hence farmers could be seen as competing 
with each other, and the option only covered certain habitats and landscape features. Using 
telephone surveys (Franks and Emery,2013) and an online consultation (Frank et al.,2016), 
and providing useful context for the more detailed qualitative approach presented in the 
current paper, they consider some of the actual and perceived issues in cross-holding 
agreements. Problems with neighbouring farmers – including personal disagreements and 
different opinions on conservation – where noted as barriers to participation, with others 
concerned that their neighbours may renege on aspects of collective agreements (Frank et 
al.,2016). This sat within the wider observation that farmers tended to prefer to work 
independently (Franks and Emery,2013). The majority of farmers, though, referred to the 
potential environmental benefits that they perceived participation would bring (Frank et 
al.,2016). Currently in the UK, the CSS offers a facilitation fund, which allows farmers 
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funding to facilitate meetings, pay for advice and develop applications in order to coordinate 
environmental benefits at the landscape scale.6  
2.2 Farming, neighbourliness and social capital 
Whilst the previous literature on collective AESs has tended to focus on the structural aspects 
of schemes, the literature above suggests that farmer-to-farmer relations are crucial. In 
seeking a more nuanced understanding of farmers’ (non)collective activities, the paper 
proposes a conceptual framing which synthesizes ideas of social capital, capital exchange and 
trust. Notions of social capital have offered insights into environmental activities generally 
(Pelling and High,2005) and aspects of agriculture specifically (Sutherland and Burton,2011; 
Svendsen and Svendsen,2000). Such approaches have been fruitful as they focus attention on 
how social and economic actions are stimulated by the nature and quality of the interactions 
within the networks of which they are part. Three authors in particular have shaped this 
thinking within social science - Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam – and 
whilst their depictions are often presented in opposition to each other because of their 
differences in terminology and orientation, there are strands from each which might help us 
think about farmers’ interactions and cooperation. Putnam (2001) offers insights, for 
example, on the role(s) of reciprocity, obligation and trust – themes which have been noted as 
important with broader studies of agricultural activity. Coleman (1994) recognises social 
capital’s fungibility, noting how it may be accumulated, replaced and exchanged, whilst 
Bourdieu’s (1986, p.51) approach to capital – which is drawn on more extensively in this 
paper - is valuable for the consideration of farming and farming neighbours because he notes 
that the amount of social capital depends on two things: “the size of the network of 
connections [they] can effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital (economic, 
cultural or symbolic) possessed in [their] right by each of those to whom [they are] 
connected”. Bourdieu’s insights have proved useful in the consideration of AES participation 
because they allow a focus on forms of capital beyond just the economic and, we would 
suggest, may arguably be extended to consider AES participation in more collaborative 
forms. Specifically, Bourdieu (1986, p.46) calls for a framing that does not simply reduce 
“the universe of exchanges to mercantile exchange, which is objectively and subjectively 
oriented toward the maximisation of profit, i.e., (economically) self-interested” and hence 
allows an appreciation of not only the more easily observable (and recorded) exchanges that 
                                                 
6 For full details see: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guide-to-countryside-stewardship-
facilitation-fund  
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may take place in more formal, often institutional, types of cooperation (Flanigan and 
Sutherland,2015) but also more informal, non-institutional, exchanges which may take place 
(Sutherland and Burton,2011). 
In understanding the (re)production of capital(s), Bourdieu calls us to consider not only 
economic capital (material goods), but also social capital (emanating from, and reaffirmed 
by, social contacts) cultural capital (knowledge, skills and dispositions which may be gained 
by education and socialisation). Alongside this, symbolic capital is the form that these other 
types may take on when they are “perceived and recognised as legitimate” (Bourdieu, 1986, 
p.17) within a particular field. In discussing the interrelation between these different forms of 
capital, Bourdieu (1986) uses the example of a painting – noting that although the ownership 
of a painting may be reduced to economic capital (who can afford to purchase it), its 
symbolic capital is only realised in the owner’s social network when they demonstrate the 
means to ‘consume’ it, that is the cultural capital (or cultural competence) to ‘read’ and speak 
of the painting in appropriate ways.7 Bourdieu uses the term habitus to refer to the “system of 
lasting and transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, function at every 
moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions” (Bourdieu,1977, p.82). 
Important for our understanding of group dynamics is a recognition that membership within a 
group – and acting in accordance with the habitus – “provides each of its members with the 
backing of collectively-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the 
various senses of the word” (Bourdieu,1986, p.51). This symbolic capital is thus important 
for defining which forms of capital (as well as how they are used) are seen as legitimate and 
enable individuals to position, and be positioned, within society. Bourdieu’s ideas of capital 
have been applied to farming, with a focus on how the most desirable social relations may be 
with those deemed to be ‘good farmers’ (Burton,2004; Burton and Paragahawewa,2011; 
Riley,2016). This assessment is made on those who exhibit capital - most notably cultural 
capital in one of its three forms: institutional (competence certified by official organisations), 
objectified (symbols of prestige in a particular group – such as crop yields or pieces of 
agricultural machinery) and embodied (skills – including motoric, mechanical and managerial 
(Burton et al., 2008; Burton and Paragahawewa,2011) – associated with effective farm 
management). As Burton et al (2008) note, in order for farmers to exhibit such capital, three 
                                                 
7 As Bourdieu (1986, p.49) specifically argues: “any given cultural competence (e.g. being able to read in a 
world of illiterates) derives a scarcity value from its position in the distribution of cultural capital and yields 
profits of distinction for its owner”.  
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conditions much be present: (1) the activity requires a skilled performance which 
differentiates between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ practice; (2) an overt sign that an effective action has 
been performed; (3) these signs must be accessible to other farmers, usually visually. The 
weight, or importance, placed on this symbolic capital within a particular group is an 
intersubjective achievement between group members. As Siisiainen (2000, p.13) suggests, 
symbolic capital: 
“depends on real practices of communication. In that respect symbolic capital cannot 
be institutionalized […] It exists and grows only in intersubjective reflection and can 
be recognized only there. Economic and cultural capital have their own modes of 
existence (money, shares; examinations and diplomas); whereas symbolic capital exist 
only in the "eyes of the others". 
Although his work does not focus specifically on cooperation – or at least cooperatives in the 
institutional sense – Bourdieu’s depiction of capital exchange provides a fruitful way to 
explore how farmers interact. In particular, it provides a clear way to understand not just 
specific instances of cooperation, but wider sets of interchanges and how these evolve(d) over 
time.  
In their discussion of farmers’ interactions Huang and Drescher suggest that “land managers 
who trust and have confidence in each other will probably work more effectively together 
and will likely require less input to foster collective action” (Huang and Drescher,2015, 
p.1351 emphasis added). Although trust is a central aspect within Putnam’s discussion of 
social capital, there is often confusion within the literature, with some authors conflating 
social capital and trust and others debating whether trust is produced by, or results from, 
social capital. Whilst Bourdieu does not specifically mention trust, it is clearly implicit in his 
work, with reference to how “the reproduction of social capital presupposes an unceasing 
effort of sociability, a continuous series of exchanges in which recognition is endlessly 
affirmed and reaffirmed” (Bourdieu,1986, p.250). In this paper we consider trust as a catalyst 
to social capital (cf. Fisher,2013), where social relationships are translated into social capital 
where trust is present – a view of trust we see as akin to Bourdieu’s ‘practices of 
communication’. The broader literature on trust is vast, and as Mikhailova (2004, p.139) 
suggests it has, unhelpfully, often seen different types of trust “lumped confusingly and 
unproductively under one concept: ‘trust’”. Whilst Putnam (2001) refers to ‘thick trust’ – that 
associated with closer and more frequent networks (such as family and close friends) and 
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‘thin trust’ which is associated with less familiar relations and may be assessed by 
reputations, norms and appearance, our consideration of how farming relations change time 
and in specific contexts calls for a more fine-grained conceptualisation of trust. 
Fukuyama (2001) draws distinction between levels of trust, focussing on the intensity (from 
high to low) with which people trust each other. They add to this the ‘trust radius’ (which 
may be broad or narrow) that places attention on the breadth or width of the circle who an 
individual will trust. These may range in scale from small cliques up to NGOs or religious 
groups, with society seen as made up of concentric and overlapping radii of trust 
(Fukuyama,2001). Those which embody high levels of social capital may have a radius of 
trust that it larger than the group itself, whilst in larger organisations which develop 
cooperative norms amongst only permanent staff or those in management positions, they may 
have a radius of trust smaller than the group (Fukuyama,2001). In paying attention to context-
specific nature of trust – something central to our paper’s concern with the relations between 
adjoining farms – Zucker’s (1986) modes of trust are useful. They distinguish between: 
institutionally-based, characteristic-based and process-based trust. First, “institutionally-
based trust” is seen as coming from formal, institutionalised, settings including, at one level, 
formal rules and regulations from government, through to trust associated with the education 
system or professional bodies. The second type, “characteristic-based trust”, is seen as a 
product of group membership that is based on social similarities or a joint identity. Here, the 
reliance is less on personal knowledge or contact per se, but instead relies on “information 
concerning social similarity” (Zucker,1986, p.51) (such as age, family background, ethnicity 
etc.), such that those with these similar characteristics may share background understandings 
which will elevate their level of trust. For the purposes of the current paper, it is important to 
note that such group membership need not be geographically restricted – so, for example, the 
‘farming community’ may be broader than just those farmers in the immediate geographical 
vicinity.  Thirdly, “Process-based trust” is based on recurring exchanges between actors. This 
mode of trust involves “a considerable amount of person-specific information” (Zucker,1986, 
p.60), whereby repeated interactions allow individuals to recognise that others will be trusted 
to act in broadly predictable ways based on these past experiences and interactions.    
In recognising a temporal dynamicity to trust, the work of Lewicki and Bunker (1996, p.124) 
and Lewicki et al (1998) is useful for examining how “trust develops gradually as the parties 
move from one stage to another” in a more transformational way. Their work takes a more 
complex view of interpersonal relationships, noting that there may be simultaneous reasons 
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for trust and distrust within the same relationship – what they refer to as different 
‘bandwidths’ and levels of ‘richness’.  Reasons for trust and distrust accumulate within 
relationships, providing more breadth as it crosses different facets of the relationships and 
leading to more depth (in various aspects of these interrelations) over time: 
“Relationships mature with interaction frequency, duration, and the diversity of 
challenges that relationship partners encounter and face together. Each of these 
components is essential. If the parties interact frequently and over a long period of 
time but only superficially, or if they have an issue-rich and frequent exchange but do 
so only around a limited and bounded problem, or if they interact around many issues 
but do so infrequently, these conditions limit the potential for the relationship to 
mature. Alternatively, if these components combine, the knowledge of each 
relationship partner is enhanced” (Lewicki et al.,1998, p.443) 
We bring together these notions of trust, social capital and good farming, to offer a more 
nuanced and robust conceptual framing of farming relations. Importantly, the paper provides 
the framework for understanding that these relations are both contextual (spatially and in 
relation to the specific issues) and may evolve and be (re)worked over time.  
3. Methods 
The research presented in this paper is drawn from interviews on 74 farms across 5 study 
sites in the UK (Figure 2). These interviews come from two projects investigating farmland 
management and conservation. The interviews within the Peak District – an upland area in 
England – focussed on the catchment areas of the River Dove and River Manifold in the 
South West of the District. The four other study sites focussed on the catchment areas of 
Lakes: Loweswater and Brotherswater located in the Lake District – an upland region in 
Northwest England; the Loch of the Lowes is in the Southern Upland of Scotland, and 
Crosemere a lowland area in Shropshire. The sites represent areas of high conservation value, 
with farmers eligible for entry into AESs. Using the catchment areas as a geographical 
boundary, initial contact was made with farmers via the Yellow Pages, with chain referral 
sampling (after Heckathorn,2002) used to locate neighbouring farms not listed. Farmers were 
sent a letter explaining the nature of the research (guaranteeing their anonymity) and 
requesting interview.8All interviews were conducted on farm and adopting, where possible, a 
                                                 
8 Size of farm/holding is not given in order that individual farms/farmers are not identifiable. 
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walking interview approach (after Riley,2010), which enabled several members of the same 
farm to engage in the research and for different parts of the farm to be visited to exemplify 
and expand on the interview responses. Of the 74 farms, 58 were participating in individual 
AESs agreements. Interviews lasted between 1 and 4 hours, often split over more than one 
visit, and focussed on the history of land management on the farm as well as the nature of 
joint working and cooperation with other farmers and how this has evolved over time. This 
in-depth interview approach was deemed suitable following the suggestion of Wynne-Jones 
(2017, p.3) that singularly economistic readings are limited and that there is a “need for richer 
sociological accounts of farmer co-operation”, particularly given the emphasis in previous 
research on using just surveys or questionnaires. Interviews were recorded and transcribed 
verbatim, with each transcript read through several times and coded manually following the 
framework set out by Jackson (2001). A number of overarching themes were identified using 
this thematic coding and are explored in the following discussion. Where their interview 
extracts are drawn upon, farmers are referred to by location (P = Peak District; L = 
Loweswater; B = Brotherswater; LL = Loch of the Lowes; C = Crosemere) followed by farm 
type(s) (D = Dairy; B = Beef; S = Sheep; A = Arable/crops).  
4.1 ‘Not in each other’s pockets’ – understanding the limits of farming cooperation 
When farmers were asked to comment on their interactions with other farmers generally, and 
their likelihood of entering into cooperative management specifically, their responses 
highlighted the complex and multi-layered nature of such engagements. The extract below, 
from a farmer in the Peak District and which will be returned to several times in the paper, 
acts as a useful entrée to the discussion which follows and highlights the multifaceted nature 
of these relations: 
 “We join up with three different neighbours and we get on with all of them. 
Frank [neighbouring farmer 1] has been here as long as us…our 
grandfathers worked together, so did our fathers, we’re the same age and 
have grown up together, so there’s a lot of history [….] John [neighbouring 
farmer 2] retired a year or so ago. His lad  has taken it on and he’s pressing 
on, but seems a nice chap and we promised John we’d always help him out 
[…] the [neighbouring farmer 3], he sadly died and his sons are not in 
farming and they’ve set the land out for grazing, so there have been various 
ones coming and going with that one, someone from away had it last year, 
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so we let them use our sheep dip…I’m not sure who’s having it this year 
though […] We get on with all of them, but we’re not in each other’s pockets” 
(Farmer 2,P-B/S) 
The first important observation is that cooperation and farming relations have a history – with 
past activities clearly leaving a legacy which shapes farmers’ interactions in the present. 
Relating to this, and arguably a factor of it, farmers’ cooperative relations are clearly not 
equal or consistent between all farmers. Whilst farmer 2 notes that they “get on well with all 
of them” his narrative goes on to reveal that individual relations are (re)shaped by different 
levels of social capital, which may be built up, and drawn upon (even across generations (see 
also Riley,2012), over time in these cooperative relations. Third, and hinted at the final part 
of the extract, is that cooperation is multifaceted – that is, cooperation in one aspect of 
farming does not necessarily translate to cooperation in another aspect.  
Turning first to the issues of history and temporality. Foregrounded in the experiences of 
farmer 2 was how past interactions were central to those in the present. Farmers were asked 
in interview to discuss if, and how, they felt their cooperation with other farmers had changed 
over time. Whilst there were several individual narratives relayed – some of which will be 
referred to later in the paper –  the interviews suggested that three common ones proves to be 
watershed moments for cooperation on most farms: the mechanisation of agricultural 
practices (in various forms), the disbandment of the Milk Marketing Board (MMB) 9 and the 
evolution of farming subsidies. Most often referred to was the disbandment of the MMB:  
 “That was when I think is started going wrong…if we’d have stuck together 
we wouldn’t see this mess we’ve got now […] we had a good system where 
everyone could make a living and then we mucked it up”(Farmer 4,P-D/S) 
“It was a few greedy buggers who let everyone down […] they thought they 
could get a few pence more and broke the whole thing up […] we had a good 
level playing field, where you knew where you stood, and they screwed it up” 
(Farmer 20,B-B/S) 
                                                 
9 The MMB was set up in 1933 as producer-run marketing board and served to provide a guaranteed minimum 
price to producers for their milk. The MMB was largely disbanded in 1993 (and finally dissolved in 2002) as 
part of the deregulation of the British Milk Market. Although not all the farmers spoken to were members of the 
MMB at the time of its disbandment, over 80% had some involvement in their farming history in selling milk 
through the MMB.  
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Two important aspects flow from this example for our broader understanding of farming 
cooperation – first, how this event led to an erosion of what may be seen as more generalised 
trust and toward a prioritisation of more local trust, and second how this disbandment, albeit 
quite subtly, served to disturb the way that social capital was generated and assessed amongst 
farmers. The reference to ‘if we’d have stuck together’ works at Zucker’s (1986) 
characteristic-based (or community) trust level – where stories referred not to specific 
acquaintances, but addressed the farming community more generally. For those interviewed, 
the move away from the MMB to a free market represented a change to the ‘rules of the 
game’ (Bourdieu,1984). Prior to this point, there had been a more general level of trust, 
creating a level of social capital which “provides each of its members with the backing of the 
collectively owned capital, a “credential” which entitles them to credit, in the various senses 
of the word” (Bourdieu,1986, p.51). Such ‘social obligations’ (Bourdieu,1986) were broad 
scale as the MMB represented a more institutionalised form of cooperation, with trust and 
obligations extending beyond just neighbours. Whilst the disbandment led to a general 
erosion this community-level trust, it simultaneously brought a reconfiguration of more local-
level relations:  
“We [several neighbours] stuck together and all went with Milk Marque10 
[…] it was no good in this part of the world all going separate ways […] 
when there is snow on the ground, we need to pull together and make sure 
we could get the milk lorry here to collect our milk” (Farmer 6,P-D/S)  
The decline of community-level trust, such responses highlighted, was important to 
reinforcing local trust, or in Fukuyama’s (2001) terms a narrower trust radius. For these 
farmers, ‘sticking together’ was born out of a sense of isolation felt with the disbandment of 
the MMB and saw a strengthening of their own, local, cooperation in order to enhance their 
resilience relating to getting their milk off their farm in periods of bad weather. As the 
aforementioned suggests, such events served to reinforce the idea of farmers’ cooperation and 
trust being less around shared characteristics at the general level of farming community 
involvement toward more direct peer-to-peer engagement and observation – or what Hardin 
(2002) might refer to as ‘updating’ the system. Social capital was built up here through direct 
exchange and experience and facilitated through more issue-centred trust. The breaking down 
                                                 
10 Milk Marque was a successor cooperative set up after the MMB, which was later forced to break up following 
a questioning by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission on his monopolistic position in relation to milk price 
changes.  
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of the institutional cooperation embodied in the MMB – or what farmer 20 referred to as 
removing the “level playing field” - also led to a challenge to how these local forms of capital 
accumulation took place:  
 “if someone was sending a lot of milk, you knew they were doing 
well…breeding well or feeding well or whatever…after [the disbandment] 
you didn’t know if they were doing well or whether they’d taken a dodgy 
handshake with someone” (Farmer 32,C-B/S) 
As Bourdieu (1984) suggests, whilst economic capital can be assessed, symbolic capital 
exists through how it is interpreted by others. The transparent, and largely standard, pricing 
of the MMB allowed farmers to assess the skill of other farmers more easily through being 
able to attribute economic and objectified cultural capital (new equipment, purchasing more 
land) to skills (embodied cultural capital) in areas such as their grassland management or 
breeding programmes rather than having a more favourable milk contract.  
Whilst the disbandment of the MMB was a quite discrete event, the more diffuse process of 
mechanisation was commonly pointed to as having a profound effect on the landscape of 
more collaborative working:  
“We’d help each other with stuff like haymaking […] if we weren’t doing it, 
we’d go over and help next door […] but when balers came in the 1950s and 
60s11 it wasn’t the same….our neighbour brought it over and I was scared it 
would break […] we got one a few years later  and then we eventually went 
to round baling and that aspect of it went…helping each other went 
altogether really” (Farmer 1,P-B/S) 
“we worked together with silage-making at one time, but [the neighbours] 
got bigger and bigger and eventually invested in a self-propelled machine 
and got into contracting too […] we thought it was time to invest in our own 
machine…those [self-propelled] machines are nearly a hundred grand, and 
I didn’t want to have to pay for their repairs if it picked up a stone in our 
fields”(Farmer 34,LL-B/S/A) 
                                                 
11 The Peak District was a relatively late adopter of baling technologies.  
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“We’ve managed to get self-sufficient over the years…as the others have got 
bigger, we’ve picked up their smaller equipment at farm sales, which will do 
for our scale of operation” (Farmer 61,L-B/S) 
Mechanisation, and the refinement of mechanisation over time, served to irrevocably change 
farming relations for most of the farmers interviewed. Crucial in all three of the extracts 
above is the idea that machinery brought monetary exchange into the system and was pointed 
to, by many, as the beginning of the erosion of cooperation in land management (or 
production) activities. As Sutherland and Burton (2011) note, a key difference between 
machinery and labour sharing is the relative value placed on each – with an easily 
quantifiable, economic, value placed on machinery, whilst farmers tend to downplay the 
value of their own (family) labour.12 The result is that the mechanisation of specific activities 
disturbed the balance of reciprocal exchanged which has previously been present in 
agriculture – as one farmer commented: “asking them for a hand to gather in some cattle is 
very very different from asking to borrow thirty grands worth of tackle”. Three outcomes of 
this mechanisation are important for contextualising AES cooperation in the present. First, 
the monetarisation of land-based activities, which saw an erosion of the previous systems of 
labour exchange and what Salzar (1993) has referred to as the ‘moral economy’ of agriculture 
– crystallised into contractual arrangements for many farms, with payments made for 
activities such as silage-making or combine harvesting. This led to a gradual erosion of 
neighbour-to-neighbour support and the associated issue-centered trust which had previously 
played a strong role in these annual activities, with contractors often being from some 
distance away. Second, and connected, the disparity noted between machine use and physical 
labour led many farmers – such as farmer 61 in the quote above – to seek to increase their 
level of independence through purchasing their own equipment to perform these tasks. Third, 
and cutting across these, land management lost some of its cooperative as well as routinized 
elements. Whilst neighbouring relations remained positive after mechanisation, it served to 
rupture the routinized system of shared involvement in land management. Using Lewicki et 
al’s (1998) terminology, we see a change from more issue-focused exchanges – specifically 
the regular, routinized and annual practices of land management – to, following 
mechanisation, a more generalised, less regular and more ad hoc set of relations.  
                                                 
12 Whilst Sutherland and Burton (2011) noted in their study areas that machinery ‘pooling’ and joint purchase 
had the potential for machinery to increase farming cooperation, this was relatively uncommon in the study sites 
in the current research. 
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Whilst the first event spoken about (the disbandment of the MMB) can be traced to a specific 
event, and the second (mechanisation) can be traced to a cumulative process in the post-war 
period, the third area was a collection of events which can be broadly categorised as 
increased state intervention. The three extracts below represent the subtly different ways that 
this state intervention has served to change farmers’ collective and cooperative arrangements: 
 “the ‘single’ farm payment says it all really. You’re on your own, your 
payment not anyone else’s […] that’s the mind-set these days” (Farmer 64,L-
B/S) 
“In the past, their stock would get into ours and we would probably have 
some on them too…. It worked out in the end […] but you can’t do that so 
much now, if the Ministry come to check you out and find you’ve not got all 
your stock accounted for, you’re in trouble” (Farmer 4,P-D/S) 
 “they are buying all sorts of shit [cows] from anywhere, same with their 
sheep. They’ve got into the spiral with it. They had one reactor13 and now 
they’ve ended up getting stock wherever they can, and they are going on and 
on with it….they’re not that good anymore” (Farmer 9,P-B/S) 
What we see here is an irrevocable change to the institutional base from which trust and 
social capital might develop. Whilst the first extract cements a more discursive boundary 
between farms, the latter two present the drawing of more literal boundaries between them. 
Farmer 4 noted that the increased tracking of livestock14 had served to formalise the division 
between farms where more informal arrangements had previously existed. Farmer 9 extends 
this further in the context of recent disease scares and what we might see as changes to the 
‘rules of the game’ and associated farming habitus. Although it was recognised that TB, as a 
prominent example discussed in interviews, may be fairly indiscriminate in terms of where 
infection occurs, the farmers suggested that a new aspect of good farming has emerged 
whereby cultural capital has started to be associated with being selective with livestock 
purchasing and movement in seeking to mitigate against herd infection. Such insights have 
relevance to understanding AESs, by highlighting social capital’s fungibility. The specific 
                                                 
13 A ‘Reactor’ is an animal which has failed a test for bovine TB.  
14 A process related, historically, to subsidy payments made to UK farmers directly for livestock and, more 
recently, associated with attempts to control the spread of disease. See Riley (2011b) for a discussion of the 
changing farmer-livestock relations around these technological advances.  
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case illustrates how subtle changes to the field (after Bourdieu,1986) – in this case the threat 
of disease – can lead to a rapid rewriting of the rules of the game, and a farmer with 
previously high levels of social capital associated with his productive farm, can lose this 
status when failing to exhibit the necessary cultural capital in this new context. The extent to 
which AESs represent a new field – and associated rules of the game – will be discussed later 
in the paper, but a key conceptual lesson here is that longstanding relations of high social 
capital may not easily translate or carry over into new contexts.  
4.2 ‘There’s working together and there’s working together’: the limits of cooperation 
The previous section highlighted some of the key events pointed to by farmers that 
(re)shaped, to greater or lesser extents, the way that they interacted with other farmers. Such 
changes have by no means led to a cessation of neighbourly relations, but it was noted that 
these had often become less formal and more ad hoc. In examining these relationships, the 
research found that the more visible forms of continued cooperation were not always with 
those farms geographically adjacent. The three following extracts illustrate different 
examples of this: 
“we take the sheep down to [farm around 15 miles away] and graze their 
meadow land over the winter when they’ve housed their cows […] it works 
well for us as it gives our land at rest and it makes sure theirs is cleaned up 
properly” (Farmer 36,LL-S) 
“We have pig muck off [farm around 2 miles away] to help get the grass 
going. Its good stuff, but they don’t have much land and most of the farms 
round them are grazing….we’ve got a lot down to maize, which is a hungry 
crop, so we can swallow plenty of it up for them. It’s a win-win I suppose 
[…] then they sometimes buy crops off us for feed too” (Farmer 33,C-A/S) 
“We’ve farmed with our cousins [a farm around 8 miles away] for getting in 
silage for a good few years. We take our trailers and cart in for them, and 
they bring theirs to us […] they are that couple of weeks ahead of us in terms 
of having the weather and the grass, just that bit better country, a bit warmer, 
so it can work for us all” (Farmer 11,P-D/B/S) 
The extracts highlight that symbiotic relationships between farmers are clearly present – and 
are often a central part of cooperation on many farms. The idea of ‘neighbours’ in these 
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cases, however, was a somewhat elastic term, with these clearer examples of farming 
cooperation not being with geographically adjacent neighbours. Indeed it is precisely because 
of these distances that the relationships work as they do. Slightly different climates and farm 
type facilitate these symbiotic and choreographed forms of interaction, with different types of 
farm activity, or the same activities occurring at different times, allowing them to work 
together. We noted in the last section that the more general, community-level, focus of trust 
may have been superseded by more local, and personalised interactions, and the evidence 
here suggests that these new relations develop most clearly on farms that are not 
geographically contiguous. For the theme of AES cooperation, we see that where the 
strongest and most active levels of cooperation currently exist, this may not be in areas of 
adjoining nature types, and it is not simply a case of being able to overlay agreements onto 
these pre-existing, well-developed, relations.  
In addition to these more durable and continuous sets of spatially-specific interactions 
between farmers, the interviews revealed that a more general pattern of transition toward 
more transitory and ephemeral relations had taken place across most farms: 
“We’ve helped all our neighbours out at some point – giving them a tow 
when they are stuck, running them a calf to market or whatever […] It’s a 
balance. I wouldn’t be scared of asking for their help…but if we were there 
all the time I’d get a bit worried about that” (Farmer 21,B-B/S)  
Important in the latter part of the quote of farmer 21 is that whilst social capital may be 
gleaned from offering help (cf. Flanigan and Sutherland,2015), it may be eroded where a 
farmer becomes over-reliant on this help, or when their peers feel they are calling on this too 
frequently. Whilst they have often been conflated, Emery (2015) draws a distinction between 
individualism and ‘independence’ – noting that individualism is a preference for working in 
isolation and independence is more correctly seen as being about a level of self-direction and 
autonomy. The quote of farmer 21 echoes Emery’s (2015) subsequent observation that 
independence can be part of interdependency. It was seen earlier in the paper that changes to 
agricultural policy and governance have led to aspects of agriculture become individualistic, 
but as the quote highlights, interdependency is still a central aspect for most of the farmers 
spoken to. Such evidence suggests, however, that there are limits to interdependency, with 
more short-term and occasional support seen as a desirable trait, but over-reliance having a 
negative impact on good farmer status. Taken together, such responses highlight, for the 
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purposes of undertaking cooperative AESs, that cooperation has boundaries. Specifically, 
farmers may be reluctant to engage in longer term, continuous, or what may be seen as a 
reliant cooperation. A second strand relating to these boundaries are the type of activities 
where cooperation may be seen as more or less appropriate. The following extracts make 
reference to different forms of cooperative activities:  
I trust all those that we join up with, no question, they are good 
neighbours…we’ve always helped each other in this valley…helping each 
other do our thing […] my wife helps the old boy next door now and again 
with his paper work, I give the other side a hand getting their sheep in 
sometimes with their shearing […] But I wouldn’t want to get into an [AES] 
agreement with them….there’s working together and there’s working 
together. How they manage their land is their own business…I wouldn’t want 
to be tied together (Farmer 66,L-B/S) 
Because we’ve only got a few sheep, we get the sheep shower to come on the 
same day…we do ours in the morning and theirs in the afternoon…gives 
them a full day’s work over this way (Farmer 13,P-B/S) 
Interviewer: and what about your land management, harvesting and things? 
No, not really with that stuff […] I went and baled a small patch for them a 
few years ago when they’d broken down. It was talking of rain and it would 
have been ruined […] but we don’t get involved in working each other’s 
land…this is an uneasy farm and I only really trust myself on it 
The farmers’ responses – common amongst those interviewed – highlight two points for the 
discussion of collective AESs: the distinction drawn between land management and other 
types of collaboration and the importance of these relations not being continuous or 
permanent. In part, the quotes echo our earlier observation that cooperation is more desirable 
on an issue-by-issue basis. This, however, feeds into a recognition of the specificity of direct 
land management. The activities most often referred to as having collaboration were those 
which might be called subsidiary or process tasks – that is, they were not directly land 
management. Emery (2015) suggests that there is often a denial of independence within 
agriculture, and we would argue that one possible explanation is the failure of previous 
research to draw distinction between the farm as a whole and specific activities therein. This 
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was clearly captured in farmer 66’s reference to land management being “their own 
business”, where collaboration is clearly visible in some tasks but is a different issue when it 
comes to the direct land management which is central to AESs. At the end of his quote, 
farmer 13 offers further insight into this distinction – and perhaps a rationale for why it has 
arisen – by referring to the very particular nature of their land. As several studies have noted, 
farmers develop very intricate, micro-scale, understanding of their land over time (Harvey 
and Riley, 2005; Riley,2008) – relating both to its production potential but also, as farmer 13 
indicates, how to safely navigate its steep or difficult terrain. Such individualising, and non-
cooperative land management does, farmer 13 suggests, arise in part through a concern for 
safety, but also a narrow bandwidth of trust a farmer may have where their neighbours do not 
have detailed, often embodied, knowledge of this specific tract of land. Taken together, such 
observations offer insights into our understanding of farming cooperation and the potential 
barriers to collective AESs. Whist cooperation clearly exists, land management (and the 
decisions around land management) have been individualised and often taken out of these 
realms of collective activity.  
Although not focussing specifically on the idea of collaborative agreements, research on AES 
uptake and participation has noted that the example set by, and experiences of, other farmers 
– particularly on neighbouring farms – can positively persuade participation, both as a result 
of their pre-existing standing in the field (Burton et al.,2008) and also in providing 
‘contextualised knowledge’ (Riley,2016) of how the scheme might relate to the specific 
farming environment in their area. A logical extension of this might be that collaborative 
agreements might build out from these participating farms. However, our interviews revealed 
that the converse situation may be presented, where participating farmers may dissuade 
others from participation: 
“They let their farm go to rack and ruin, never did any drainage, let their 
walls fall down […] they get a couple of rare plants and they are the poster 
boy of conservation…well we’re not getting involved with them, now way. 
Not getting tarred with that brush” (Farmer 26,B-B/S) 
 This is perhaps an example of what Putnam (2001) refers to as ‘dark side’ of social capital – 
whereby a sense of isolation and exclusion may occur. As Portes (1998) argues, such ‘not so 
desirable consequences’ of sociability have often been ignored in what they refer to as the 
sociological bias to see the positive things emerging out of social relations. Whilst strong ties, 
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and adherence to the rules of the game, may bring member benefits, so too they may lead to 
exclusion – or what they refer to as ‘negative social capital’ (Portes,1998,p.15). In this case, 
past demonstrations of ‘good farming’ and adhering to the ‘rules of the game’ are important 
aspects of capital generation in the present (Burton et al.,2008; Riley,2016). For the farmer in 
question, his neighbouring farmer’s failure to adhere to the rules of the game – specifically 
the engagement with ‘tidy farming’ (and the associated skills (cultural capital)) - meant that 
they held insufficient capital to be seen as someone to work collaboratively with. Although 
examples such as the lack of land drainage can be seen as instances where what is considered 
good farming misaligns with current conservation efforts - as the resulting waterlogged land 
is seen as a good for wading birds in this instance - it illustrates how previous actions shape 
the willingness to engage collaboratively with other farmers. The important point here is that 
capital may flow in both directions as part of this potential collaboration. The conservation 
status of the farm and the farmer becomes superseded and overwritten by the fact this 
conservation status results, in part, in the eyes of farmer 26, from what he considers to be 
poor farming practices. A collaborative agreement, therefore, is not simply reducible to 
cooperating around a specific set of management prescriptions. For farmer 26 and many 
similar farmers, it carries the possibility of being ‘tarred with the same brush’ – that is, 
characterised as being similar, by association, with someone not being seen as a good farmer.  
Just as these longer histories of interaction between farmers and their neighbours may 
(re)shape their willingness to engage in collaborative AESs, so too may a lack of longer-term 
engagement. This was seen most acutely in examples where neighbouring land was rented, 
with the two following examples offering different perspectives on this:  
 “they have a very good farm and they have a lot of it in HLS.15 They have 
always been good farmers [….] but they take on a lot of grass eating and 
thrash the hell out of it…it’s a good few miles away, but they graze it late 
into the winter and it gets poached up and looks a right mess […] I’d be 
reluctant to get into an agreement with them” (Farmer 15,P-B/S) 
“we’ve got a block right down the side of us, encloses our land on two sides 
[…] the farmer retired and rents it out to the highest bidder [….] well, they 
                                                 
15 Higher Level Stewardship – the Higher Tier of the ESS which focussed on specific areas of high conservation 
value across the UK. Now closed to new applicants – although some farmers have agreements that are still 
running – it has been superseded by the CSS Higher Tier, see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/countryside-stewardship-higher-tier-manual  
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are ranching it pretty bad, so any good for the environment that I’m doing is 
being lost with what they are up to” (Farmer 31-B/S) 
Previous research has noted that farmers act in ‘property-centric’ (Cooke and Moon,2015) 
ways, and the observations on rental land from those such as farmer 15 and 31 are important 
for both our understanding of good farming generally and also our specific consideration of 
AESs. For our understanding of good farming, such evidence suggests that in addition to the 
need to recognise the regional geographic variations in what is seen as good farming (see 
Riley,2016 for a discussion) we might also add more specific micro-geographical elements. 
Several researchers have pointed to how farmers police, through observation, the good 
farming status of their neighbours (Burton,2004), but our interview findings suggest that such 
policing is less pronounced (or possible) where land is away from the main farmstead and/or 
is used on temporary or short-term leases. Here we see what we might refer to as emplaced 
good farming, whereby farmers might exhibit, and be credited, for their good farming traits 
and practices in the area around their main farm or homestead, whilst at the same time 
undertaking less desirable practices on the land further from their home.16 Such uncertainties 
relating to land tenure may provide both structural as well as social barriers to attempts to 
work collaboratively at the landscape level. Structurally, such short-term management – 
resulting from short-term, and often less formal, tenancy agreements - may leave pockets of 
land not management in environmentally optimal ways, which might hinder attempts to 
develop wildlife corridors or mosaics. This in turn may create the more social problems 
alluded to respectively by farmer 15 and 31, where farmers renting land lack the necessary 
capital and trust to foster collaboration – because of both their shorter term and more 
transitory engagement with it - and may engender a sense of them acting as barriers to 
successful collective agreements.  
4.3 Considering collective conservation 
It has been argued in the broader literature on environmental cooperation that good 
communication is a central requirement (Emery and Franks,2012), with the suggestion that 
where good lines of communication currently exist they may provide a firm basis for 
collaborative AESs. In this context, the paper’s earlier observation that land management 
                                                 
16 Indeed, there were interview respondents who made reference to taking on additional, non-agreement, land on 
short-term and informal agreements in order to adhere to the stocking levels and/or management practices on 
land where they hold AES agreements.  
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activities were a less collaborative and more individual endeavour, took on a practical 
significance in relation to the discussion of AESs:  
“I don’t know what they’re [adjoining farm] are up to on that front 
[conservation] […] I’ve never spoken to them about that that [….] they seem 
to have been grazing less heavy, so I’m guessing they’ve got some sort of 
agreement on” (Farmer 67,L-S).  
I know they were in the [earlier scheme], but they have changed things and 
they hadn’t enough points to get in to [the new one]17 (Farmer 24,C-B) 
I know they’re in a scheme because I’ve heard them say it at meeting, but I 
don’t know what thing they’ve got entered into what […] you can see they’ve 
done some cutting there18, but beyond that I’m not sure (Farmer 18,P-B/S) 
The situation outlined by these farmers was seen on over half of the farms spoken to, where 
there was little or no knowledge of the specific AES agreements of other, neighbouring, 
farmers. This echoes, in part, our earlier observation that farmers may have become distanced 
from each other’s land management activities, but ties more closely to the idea that there is 
little symbolic capital associated with farmland conservation (see for example Burton and 
Paragahawewa,2011; Riley,2016). A practical consequence of this is that farmers proved 
unlikely to talk about their conservation practices in general and thus, at least in our sample, 
very unlikely to engage in more organic discussions of collective activity beyond their own 
farms. Compounding this, the ‘hedgerow farming’ (Burton,2004) which has been seen to be 
an important part of farmers’ surveillance of each other, and from which much social capital 
is seen to flow, is relatively difficult for conservation work. It is only the visible practices that 
were seen to be outside normal routines – such as large capital works such as drystone 
walling or the specific mowing of rushes in the example above – that gave farmers any sense 
of what conservation work their neighbours may be doing. As such, they arguably lack the 
‘intensive and transparent communication’ that has been seen as essential in other 
cooperative contexts (Mettepenningen et al.,2012, p.16). Although it is not possible to 
quantify from our study, such observations raise questions about potential change that AESs 
might bring about, with very few farmers commenting on visible change to farms (theirs or 
others’) or the broader landscape brought about by scheme prescriptions. Related to and 
                                                 
17 In order to protect the identity of the farmer, specific scheme details have not been given.  
18 Mowing patches of rush pasture as part of a Higher Level Stewardship Agreement.  
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feeding on from this point, even where neighbouring agreements were known about, these 
were not always conducive to a desire to collaborate: 
“They’re in the scheme […] but they’re breaking the rules left, right and 
centre….I’ve seen them spreading slurry on foggy days […] plastering it 
with sheep […] I’m relying on those payments so couldn’t risk being involved 
with them” (Farmer 40,B-B/S) 
I know what they’ve got in agreements, we chatted about that when we signed 
up […] but I’ve no idea if they are any good at it […] we’ve had an 
invertebrate survey here and they say the meadows are definitely improving, 
but I don’t know what theirs are like (Farmer 17,P-D/B/S) 
Respective interviews revealed that in these cases there were similar, adjoining, habitats that 
should represent an ideal scenario for a collaborative agreement. Here, however, willingness 
to participate in AESs was not in question, but instead their respective performance within 
these agreements. If two lessons from earlier in the paper are that collective relations take a 
good deal of time to build up, and many farmers still base their assessments of others’ good 
farming on conventional agricultural practices – the evidence here suggests that a clear 
barrier to AES participation lies in assessing ‘good conservation farming’. Most easy to 
assess is bad practice, noted in the clear contravening of the rules observed by farmer 40 – 
and as previous research highlights, once such bad practices have been observed, it may take 
years to (re)build stocks of social capital. Such examples echo Lewicki et al’s (1998) 
observation that trust and distrust may appear simultaneously in one relationship – with such 
examples showing that trust associated with wider farming relations may not extend to trust 
in performance within AESs. More fundamentally, however, was the ability of farmers to 
assess the work of others. Burton et al (2008) note that being able to visibly see the results of 
skilled performance is central to development of social capital and good farmer status. For 
farmers such as farmer 17, it was difficult to ascertain which of their neighbours’ activities 
were part of AES agreements and, more fundamentally, there was uncertainty over whether 
such practices were in fact environmentally beneficial. Here we see that there has been 
insufficient change in the ‘rules of the game’ (and farming habitus) to update symbols of 
good farming to be associated with AES management (cf. Riley,2016). Specifically for 
collective agreements, even when participating in the same schemes, insufficient information 
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was available for farmers to make an assessment of the farming status of their neighbours to 
provide a foundation on which to initiate discussions or build up the level of trust required.  
Moving from the more general discussion of AESs, the research asked farmers participating 
in AES about whether they would extend these to collective agreements. Specific, and 
potentially collective, management practices were discussed, and the extracts below come 
from conversations relating to the specific examples of tree planting and rewetting land 
respectively: 
“We are up to the wire with our July cutting date [prescribed in AES 
agreement]…I’m in with the mower as soon as I can be after then as we need 
the aftermath grazing for the cows […] I wouldn’t be able to shift that to join 
in with anyone else” (Farmer 18,P-D/S) 
“Would I consider planting to the extent that they [neighbours] have done 
there [area of mature trees over neighbouring boundary]?...Yes, I’ve thought 
about more planting, but not there…that piece is good shelter for our grazing 
land just below it, so I wouldn’t go there…I’d perhaps plant something on 
the wet area [on the centre of their farm] that we can’t do much with” 
(Farmer 3,P-B/S). 
“No, I don’t think I’d want to make it any wetter…It’s not producing much, 
but it takes the pressure off and gives us a little bit of grazing to keep the 
stocking rate down on the other agreement land” (Farmer 21,B-B/S) 
Two interrelated findings emerge of relevance to the broader discussion of collective AESs. 
A general lack of attention to broader, landscape-scale, conservation amongst the farmers 
spoken to, and what we might refer to as the ‘constrained conservation’ that potentially limits 
joining up conservation efforts with neighbouring farmers. Although many farmers were in 
agreements, there was little reference to the wider impacts of landscape connections of their 
activities. The two most common sentiments included farmer 7’s reference to “I just follow 
the rules I’ve been given for my land and don’t look over the fence” and farmer 14’s to “if 
they [other farmers] sign up and follow the rules too, then it should all come together”. The 
interviews suggest that the historical development of land management, as an individual 
activity, was reinforced by the introduction of farm-level management prescriptions, and 
when placed alongside the difficulty in observing the conservation activities of others, 
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conservation has for the majority of farmers become framed as an individual, rather than 
landscape-level issue. Farmer 19’s suggestion that “if we all follow our rules then it should 
all piece together” was common amongst farmers and demonstrated a general reluctance to 
collaborate. Further explanation of this reluctance may come from the way that many farmers 
spoken to engaged with AESs in what might be called a ‘constrained’ way. This, we would 
argue, is a factor of how the management of farms has often evolved in an internally-
coordinated, rather than outward-facing, way. In a more productivist sense, this was seen in 
the examples in Scotland and the Lake District, where hill land was grazed in the summer and 
lowland in the winter. Whilst there have been some adaptations to their management in order 
to enter schemes, this too had been choreographed within their farms. Two main examples of 
participation were observed – those who had made very few changes to their pre-agreement 
management (see Wilson,1996 for similar observations) and those which might be seen as 
‘stretching to entry’. Examples included those for whom their stocking rate was close to the 
maximum allowed, or those such as farmer 18 whose management meant that grazing only 
narrowly fitted with the AES date restrictions on cutting or grazing. This stretched entry 
meant that they had little flexibility when they were asked specific questions about changing 
cutting dates, grazing patters or seeking to develop new habitats. Where such developments 
were mentioned, it was to the inward facing concerns, rather than the wider landscape, to 
which they turned. 
5. Conclusions 
The paper has looked at the ‘step change’ needed to make AESs more successful in their 
landscape conservation ambitions. Although the policy context for collective AESs arguably 
now exists, our understanding of farmers’ willingness and ability to cooperate in relation to 
conservation and AESs has, hitherto, been limited. Our findings in this paper suggest that this 
limitation may, in part, be born out of the tendency of previous research to focus on 
cooperation in relation to themes of collective buying or selling and from this assume similar 
relations for cooperative land management and conservation. Our findings, however, 
highlight that land management represents a different, more unique, case in relation to 
cooperation. Alongside this, where collective AESs have been discussed it has most often 
focussed on the structural elements of schemes and hypothetical cases, rather than unpicking 
the deeper sets of farming relations which underpin farmers’ collective dispositions and those 
specifically relating to land management and conservation that we have highlighted here. Our 
two broad findings are that farmer-to-farmer relations are temporally layered and these 
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relations are not universal (both in relation to neighbours and different areas of the farm), but 
are specific to different farming activities. Taken together, these findings challenge the 
working assumption in much previous research that cooperation is uniform and static and the 
associated conclusion that collective AESs may be overlaid onto pre-existing examples of 
good farming relations. Whilst we found positive relationships with neighbours amongst 
almost all of those interviewed, very few proved willing to engage in collective AES 
agreements.  
We have observed that changes to agriculture – and three watershed events in particular – 
have served to irrevocably change the nature of trust (and hence social capital and the nature 
of cooperation) between farmers. These insights highlight the importance of recognising the 
antecedents of current farming relations, and warn against the assumption that successful 
collective conservation in one area – such as the Dutch example referred to in our 
introduction – can be taken as evidence that this will have similar success in the UK.  By 
considering the context-specific historical development of these relations, the paper has seen 
that distinct forms of cooperation have evolved and, more significantly for collective AESs, 
land management has become a predominantly independent activity. Bourdieu (1986) has 
argued that for social capital to successfully develop, continuous social relations are needed. 
We have seen here that the watershed events served to disrupt this continuity and make it 
more partial, with cross-farm cooperation remaining strong for certain, more subsidiary, tasks 
but these watershed events – individually and collectively – making land management 
activities a more individual and independent activity. Moreover, we have observed a more 
structural geographical challenge for AESs. In those few examples where more close and 
regular collaboration takes place – and where collective AESs might be most feasible – they 
are often on farms that are not geographically contiguous. The social relations which 
underpin positive inter-farm relations do not always, we would argue, map onto the natural 
habitats and features that we may wish to preserve.  
The paper has reported on several more practical findings relating to farmers’ potential 
engagement with collective AESs, namely: the challenge of reliance on other farmers, a 
general lack of inter-farm communication around conservation activities, and what we have 
termed constrained engagement with existing AESs. In noting the importance of social 
capital, and capital exchange, the paper has shown that collective AES participation is not 
reducible to particular management prescriptions, it is, in the eyes of farmers, also about 
association with other farmers – and the implications this may have for their ‘good farmer’ 
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and reputational status. The paper has seen that a significant challenge for collective AESs is 
that the historical evolution of farming cooperation has developed a farming habitus which 
prizes intermittent, rather than continuous or reliant, support. As such, being closely 
connected – particularly contractually – in collective AESs was considered antithetical to 
good farming. In terms of administering collective AESs, this presents challenges. At the 
most extreme end of the spectrum, the solution of widespread compulsion of collective 
activity is unlikely to be feasible (see Franks and Emery,2013). At the other end of the 
spectrum, the maintenance of the status quo of seeking to increase individual agreements, in 
the hope of collective landscape benefit, is likely to remain most palatable to farmers. 
Progressing this evidently problematic status quo might include less standardised entry 
requirements (and eventual prescriptions). At one level this could include a stronger level of 
direction amongst scheme administrators to vary individual farm prescriptions, particularly 
through one off and enhanced payments to take account of, and dovetail with, neighbouring 
farm agreements. In conjunction with this, and born out of our observation of constrained 
conservation, a more radical approach would be to allow specific areas of habitat to be 
sacrificed as others are prioritised. That is, a value judgement made over whether allowing a 
farmer to heavily graze, for example, one area of land in order to facilitate later/more flexible 
cutting date on other areas to choreograph with surrounding farmers’ managements. Here, 
assessments (both ecological and economic) would need to be made over whether a collective 
landscape benefit – which might include previously non-participating farmers engaged to 
enter parts of their farm – outweighs such sacrifices and what habitats become prioritised. 
Although previous research has suggested a potential impasse whereby AES participation 
challenges the pre-established identities of farmers and thus may be culturally unsustainable 
(see Burton et al.,2008), our recognition of the emplaced nature of good farming offers some 
insight. Whilst this previous research has tended to see categorisation at the aggregate level, 
classifying in binary terms as good farmers or not, our analysis suggests that this may mask 
different underlying values and actions that farmers exhibit in relation to different areas that 
they farm (especially where land is rented). We see potential here, therefore, for a more 
variable, habitat-specific trade-off approach which would offer the practical advantage of 
lifting the challenge of constrained conservation – particularly amongst non-participating 
farmers- and at the same time allowing less of an identity challenge to that noted in previous 
research.  
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The paper has noted the challenge of farmers’ general lack of communication about their 
conservation activities, and the compounding factor that they find it difficult to assess (or 
place value on) the conservation efforts of their neighbours. An obvious recommendation 
here, echoing previous research (Prager,2015a), is that intermediaries such as scheme 
officials may help increase the flow of information. To this we would add the importance of 
these intermediaries taking the time to understand the detailed historical contexts under which 
these farming patterns have evolved. Although our findings suggest a potentially bleak 
picture for collective AESs, the longer temporal purview that we have taken suggests that 
change is possible. Our analysis has shown that trust and social capital are fungible and that 
changes to the rules of the game – initiated by watershed events such as those referred to – 
can lead to changes in how good farming is assessed and performed. Turing to Bourdieu 
(2000) again, he suggests that such change often requires a ‘crisis event’ and whilst some 
have suggested that recent changes to agricultural policy such as the decoupling of 
agricultural support and the associated introduction of ‘cross-compliance’ may represent a 
significant change to the rules of the game (Riley,2016; Sutherland,2013), our evidence 
suggests that even more thoroughgoing changes may be needed to herald more widespread 
collective agri-environmental activity.    
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